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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in applying the law to
the facts of the case concerning contract interpretation, standards of ambiguity, unconscionability, mutuality and whether a
contract is illusory.
2. Whether there are sufficient findings by the trial
court upon which to base its Order that the lease in question is
not ambiguous or unconscionable.
3. Whether it was error for the trial court to fail to
a

PPly principals of contract interpretation wherein ambiguity in

a document are to be construed against the party drafting the
document.
4.

Whether it was error for the trial court to fail to

consider the Affidavits of the Plaintiff/Appellant and of Gloria
Erickson and to make no findings thereon.
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION

None.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a Summary Judgment Order on an
issue of contract interpretation issued in the Third Judicial
District Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to
the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
under Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(h).
STATEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a decision rendered in the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, by the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment. The case arose by Plaintiff filing a Complaint on July
22, 1987, and a Motion for Summary Judgment November 25, 1987, on
which a hearing was held December 1, 1987. Judge Uno issued a
written Memorandum Decision which was entered January 4, 1988,
ruling against Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum
Decision attached as Exhibit B hereto). An Order and Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on April 4, 1988.
(Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached as
Exhibit C hereto). This Order was appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court and subsequently transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This case involves Plaintiff who is a successor in
interest to a lease executed April 29, 1977 between William N.
Jennings as Lessor and Defendant, Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., as Lessee. (Lease attached as Exhibit A.) The lease allows
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Defendant to erect and maintain a large billboard on Plaintiff's
property in exchange for an annual rent. Plaintiff is the third
owner of the property subject to the lease agreement since it was
executed and she acquired the property by purchase in 1983.

At

all times material to this proceeding it was Plaintiff's
understanding that the lease term was ten years and that lease
would thus expire on April, 1987. At that time Plaintiff
attempted to terminate the lease with the Defendants and was told
that they considered the lease term to be for twenty years.
On Summary Judgment the Plaintiff argued that the lease
was unconscionable, illusory, ambiguous and should be construed
against the Defendant who drafted the document to find that
Plaintiff could terminate the lease after the ten year term.
Judge Uno determined that "the terms of the contract are clear
and unequivocal," that the contract was not unconscionable by
present or subsequent events, and that it stated a lease term for
ten years with an automatic renewal option for the term of the
lease which, in effect, created a twenty year term. Judge Uno
also ruled that the lease was binding on all successor owners of
the premises. (Exhibit B, R. 220-225.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising currently has a
billboard at 2735 South 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
(hereinafter the "Premises"). Plaintiff Lorraine Miller, owns the
premises upon which Defendant maintains it's billboard which she
purchased in late 1983. (Exhibit E, Miller Affidavit, para. 1 ) .
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Defendant entered into a lease agreement (hereinafter
"Lease") on or about April 29, 1977, with William Jennings, a
prior owner of the premises providing that the Defendant could
construct and maintain a billboard on the premises in exchange
for a $240.00 annual rental fee. (Exhibit A.)
The lease states that it is effective "for a term of ten
years commencing on or before the first day of May, 1977".
(Lease, Exhibit A, para. 2.)
Defendant did construct and has maintained this
billboard on said premises up until the present time. (Exhibit D,
Miller Affidavit, para. 3, R-54).
Plaintiff purchased the premises on which the billboard
is located in 1983, from Gloria Erickson who informed her that
the billboard lease term was ten years and that it would expire
in May of 1987. (Exhibit F, Miller Affidavit, para. 2; Exhibit E,
Erickson Affidavit, para. 1-4, R-53; 79.)
Plaintiff notified Defendant by letter dated January 26,
1987, and by Certified Letter dated April 29, 1987, that she
desired to terminate the lease and requested that Defendant
remove the billboard from the premises. Defendant refused to
vacate the premises and told Plaintiff that he interpreted the
lease as providing for a twenty year term. (Exhibit D, Miller
Affidavit, para. 4 & 5, R-53.)
The lease provides for termination exclusively at the
option of the Lessee (Defendant) prior to the end of the lease
term, upon various conditions. (Lease, para. 5 ) .
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In a separate paragraph from the lease term, the lease
contains a renewal-type clause as follows:
'"^his lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period, thereafter, this
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and
conditions for a like successive period or periods,
unless Lessor delivers to Lessee notice of termination
within ninety days of the end of said term." (Lease,
para. 4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. That the lease is ambiguous as a matter of law and
should be construed against the drafter to find it can be terminated by Plantiff Lessor after a ten year term.
II. That the lease is so overwhelmingly favorable to the
Defendant Lessor as to make the lease unconscionable, and thus
not binding on Plaintiff.
III. That the Defendant is not bound by the lease which
makes the contract illusory and void, and not binding on the
Plaintiff.
ARGUMENTS
Introduction
At all material times Plaintiff understood that the
lease agreement with Defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising could
be terminated ten years from its inception, that is, April, 1987.
Plaintiff took all possible steps to understand and confirm that
this was the case when she purchased the premises in 1983. These
steps included personal review of the contract, obtaining a legal
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opinion, reviewing the title report and receiving assurances
from the seller Gloria Erickson. (See Affidavits, Exhibits D, E,
F.) All of these sources assured or confirmed to Plaintiff that
the lease could be terminated after ten years and that the
billboard could then be removed. Plaintiff submits that a review
of the lease and the facts herein reveal a clear ambiguity on the
length of the lease term which should be resolved against the
Defendant who drafted the contract.
The District Court decision on Summary Judgment did not
even address the issues of ambiguity or lack of mutuality in its
decision which is reversible error. Plaintiff submits that this
is not a case of wanting to be relieved from an undesireable
bargain but that the lease contains patent ambiguities which
Plaintiff, her predecessors in interest, the title company and
several attorneys have all confirmed.
Other defects exist in the lease which arguably lacks
mutuality, is thus illusory, and because of its deceptive
language and one-sidedness is also

unconscionable.

For these

reasons the lease should be found not binding on Plaintiff. Judge
Uno failed to properly apply these principles of contract
interpretation to the facts herein which, if properly applied
require this court to find the lease is now terminated and rule
for Plaintiff.
I. THE COURT SHOULD FIND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE
LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS.
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Plaintiffs submit that the question of ambiguity is
patent on the face of the lease and supported by a review of the
circumstances surrounding the lease history. On review of an
issue of law this Court is not required to give deference to the
trial court's judgment. Forbes v. St. Marks, 81 Ut.Adv.Rpt 18.
The trial court herein in fact ignores Plaintiff's arguments on
ambiguity and lack of mutuality focusing instead on unconscionability. Plaintiff submits that there are several ambiguities in
the term provisions of the lease which make it impossible to
determine what the parties' intended and must be construed
against the drafter of the contract Reagan Outdoor Advertising.
A. Contradictory Terms in the Lease Create Ambiguity.
The lease in part provides:
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee...
for a term of ten years commencing on or before 1st day
of May 1977
This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; thereafter this
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and
conditions for a like successive period or periods,
unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination
within ninety days of the end of said term. (Emphasis
added.)

The above quoted langauge granted to Defendant explicitly a term
of ten years, yet also appears to provide for continuation of the
lease term for a "like successive period." By this language the
Defendant may have contemplated a minimum term of twenty years,
although drafted as two ten year terms. The Plaintiff herein
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however, did not have this understanding and due to the contradictory provisions the intent of the original parties cannot be
determined from the face of the lease.
This Court is thus presented with a question of
construction and in Utah, this lease must be construed against
the drafter, in this case the Defendant Reagan Outdoor
Advertising. The Supreme Court has stated it thus:
"The well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract should
be resolved against the party who had drawn the
agreement".
Sears v.

Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). See also

§206 Restatement of Contracts, (Second) comment (a).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held in Russell v.
Valentine, 376 P.2d 548 (Utah, 1962), that where lease renewal
provisions are unclear, they should be construed against the
drafter. The Defendant herein drafted the lease; it now relies on
the ambiguity, written into the lease for its own benefit, to
retain the premises for another ten years.

Construing the Lease

against its drafter requires a conclusion that it was for a term
of ten years and that Plaintiff's interpretation prevail.
B. Use of

the Phrase "Said Term" in the Lease

Term and Renewal Provisions is Ambiguous
In the lease language quoted above it is clear that the
Plaintiff, as Lessor, has a right to terminate the agreement
"within ninety days at the end of "said term", (emphasis added).
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What is unclear is what the phrase "said term" refers to. Since
this phrase is subject to more than one interpretation it is
therefore ambiguous.
Plaintiff's submit that the phrase "said term" can be
interpreted three different ways:
(i) to refer only to the initial "term of ten years";
(ii) to refer only to the subsequent "like successive
period" or, "like successive period or periods"; and,
(iii) to refer to the initial phrase "term of ten years",
the subsequent phrase "like successive period" and the phrase
"like successive period or periods".
Importantly, the phrase "said term" may be interpreted
to refer only to the initial "term of ten years." The word "term"
is used in the phrase "same term" and the phrase "term of ten
years" although it is never used in the phrases "like successive
period" or "like successive period or periods". Thus, Plaintiff's
belief that she could terminate the lease after one ten year term
is unquestionably a reasonable construction of the contract
language.
Ambiguity is created as the phrase "said term" may also
be interpreted to refer to the initial language "term of ten
years" the subsequent "like successive period" and "the like successive period or periods." Each of these phrases pertain to the
duration of the agreement and it is impossible to determine what
is intended on the face of the document.
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It is evident that Defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising
apparently believes that because of the placement of the phrase
"said term" that phrase refers only to the subsequent "like successive period" or the "like successive period or periods".
However, the phrase "said term" can definitely be interpreted in
several fashions as indicated above. Notwithstanding Defendant's
belief, it is Plaintiffs position that since the phrase "said
term" is subject to more than one interpretation, that the termination provision is patently ambiguous. Because it is ambiguous, the termination provision must be construed against Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, the drafter of the agreement and Plaintiff
should have been allowed to terminate the agreement "within
ninety days of the end of" the initial "ten year term". Timely
notice of termination was sent to Defendants and thus the
agreement should be deemed terminated.
C. Applying Rules of Contract Interpretation Requires a.
Finding of a. Ten Year Lease Term,
The Restatement of Contracts (Second) sets forth certain
standards of preference in contract interpretation, including,
the rule that "specific terms and exact terms are given greater
weight than general language". Section 203(c), comment (e) to
that section states that:
"Attention and understanding are likely to be in
better focus when language is specific or exact, and in
case of conflict, the specific or exact term is more
likely to express the meaning of the parties with
respect to the situation than the general language."
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In the lease in question attention is directed to the
blanks in the second paragraph which are filled in with the date
the lease term begins and where it states "a term of ten years
commencing on or before (blank)

day of (blank), 19

...M.

Applying this rule of interpretation requires the Court to uphold
Plaintiff's view that the lease creates a ten year term which is
an explicit exact term rather than the ambiguous and deceptive
language buried in the contract which arguably creates an automatic renewal provision and a twenty year term (although without
ever using the word "renewal" or "lease term").

Plaintiff thus

requests a declaration by this Court that the lease is ambiguous
as a matter of lav/ and that the ambiguity be resolved against the
Defendant.
II. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY THE TERMS OF ITS LEASE;
THE CONTRACT IS THEREFORE, ILLUSORY.
When the entirety of the lease is examined, it is evident that it can be terminated at the sole option of the
Defendant without limitation. It thus becomes clear that only one
party is bound by this lease, the Plaintiff herein, which makes
the contract illusory and void. Although this argument was presented at the Summary Judgment hearing, Judge Jlno makes no
reference

to this argument in his Memorandum Decision.
Defendant has reserved for itself, the contractual right

of termination at its sole option as specified in paragraph 5 of
the lease; to wit:
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1. If the advertising space becomes "obstructed so as to
lessen the advertising value of any of Lessee's
signs";
2. If "traffic is diverted or reduced";
3. If the use of any sign is "prevented or restricted by
law" ;
4. If "for any reason a building permit for erection or
modification is refused;"
Reason one and two are entirely subject to the discretion of the Defendant to interpret and thus present no real
limitations. The fourth reason presented definitely gives the
Defendant unbounded discretion to terminate the contract at his
sole option. The building codes which govern Defendant's advertising are undoubtedly within the Defendant's expertise and
knowledge. Defendant could easily submit a building permit for
modification of the billboard that does not comply with applicable codes, expecting and desiring refusal of it's permit. Such
refusal would create in Defendant, the contractual power to terminate the lease. The lease provides that Defendant may terminate
the lease if the building permit is refused "for any reason". The
Salt Lake City Ordinances on advertising regulations found at
Title 51, Chapter 7, et seq., contain explicit standards which
are easily breached. Even the failure to include a required document in a permit application can result in disapproval. Rev.Ord.
SLC §51-7-308. Such an omission comes within the contractual
language giving Defendant the power to terminate his lease for
that reason. That such a reason is within the exclusive control
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of the Defendant, that it can be contrived, that it can be used
by Defendant to avoid it's contractual obligations, renders the
lease invalid as unconscionable and as an illusory contract.
Such mutuality was at issue in the case Resource
Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc.,
706 P.2d 1028 (1985, Utah), where the Court said:
"When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a
statement made in such vague or conditional terms that
the person making it commits himself to nothing, the
alleged 'promise' is said to be 'illusory'. An illusory
promise, neither binds the person making it, nor functions as consideration for a return promise."

In this case, the lease gives only the Defendant-Lessor
specific termination privileges prior to the end of the lease
term and three of the four grounds for termination are wholly
within its control. The lease was thus one terminable at the will
of one party, the option of the Defendant.
Dealing with renewal rather than termination, in an opinion without extensive analysis, the Washington Supreme Court
considered an analogous fact situation in Logan v. Time Oil
Company, 437 P.2d 192 (Wash. 1968). The lessee of a gas station
sued for specific performance, relying on a provision giving it
the right to extend a ten-year lease for an additional ten years.
The Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the "so-called
lease [was] lacking in mutuality and binding upon neither party
for a fixed term," Id. at 193. Therefore it "created no more than
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a tenancy from month to month, and, ...was not subject to
renewal or extension against the will of the lessor." Id.
Defendant Lessee's power of termination in this case produce a
similar result and this Court should declare that the lease is an
illusory contract and therefore void for lack of mutuality.
III. THE TERMS OF THE LEASE ARE SO OVERWHELMINGLY
FAVORABLE

TO DEFENDANT AS TO MAKE THE LEASE

UNCONSCIONABLE
The Defendant, or it's agents, drafted the lease. As
presented to Plaintiff's predecessor, the lease is a form
contract consisting of eight unnumbered paragraphs, containing
blanks for the insertion of the date, commencement of rental
term, property address, and rental amount. A property owner
reviewing this lease would very likely believe that the only term
open for negotiation was price.

That property owner, even after

carefully reading the lease, would be unlikely to understand how
favorable to the Defendant the lease was.
The contradictory clauses can be interpreted to create a
lease for a term of ten years or for a term of twenty years. The
Plaintiff interprets the lease as a term of ten years based on
paragraph 2 giving the lessee the right to maintain outdoor
advertising structures on the premises "for a term of ten years"
which is explicitly written in the lease. In contrast, Defendant
interprets this as a lease for a term of twenty years based on
paragraph 4 of the lease which states "this lease shall con-
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tinue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive
period". Defendant claims this clause gives it the automatic
right to lease the premises for an additional ten years, creating
in effect, a twenty year lease. Such a construction is
unconscionable.
Granting the Defendant an automatic twenty year leasehold renders the ten year term meaningless, except as used by the
Defendant to double the stated term. If Defendant desired a term
of twenty years, it could have easily created a document explicitly stating that the term of the lease was to be twenty years.
This Court should not now sanction such misleading practices
which have no other purpose then to deceive an innocent lessor,
by allowing Defendant an additional ten years.
Utah has described unconscionability as a strong inequality in bargaining power and as a contract "in which no
decent, fairminded person would view the ensuing result without
being possessed of a profound sense of injustice".

Resource

Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc.,
706 P.2d

1028, 1041 (1985), (quoting Carlson v.

Hamilton, 332

P.2d 989 (Utah 1958). The Court further stated that substantive
unconscionability "is indicated by contract terms so one-sided as
to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party." Id. (quoting
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 445 (Utah, 1983)). See also,
Bray Livestock, Inc. v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 61 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 44
(filed 7/10/87.) When read with the provision granting lessee a
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ten-year term, as it must be, the provision granting continuation
"on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period"
is a semi-concealed and self-serving provision; and it is thus
unconscionable. The deceptive nature of the language creating the
alleged twenty year lease term claimed by Defendant, alone or
combined with Defendant's unilateral right of termination,
creates a gross disparity in terms which is unconscionable.
This lease is also unconscionable as it is terminable at
the will of one party, the option of the Defendant, and is sc
one-sided as to destroy any implied good faith limitation. The
present situation also contains many of the elements of a transaction which the Utah Supreme Court held in the Resource
Management case were substantively unconscionable.

Supra 706

P.2nd at 1042. In this case there is a gross disparity of
bargaining power and contradictory printed terms which are hidden
in the contract. The facts of Plaintiff's case also contain elements of procedural unconscionability as noted in the Resource
Management case such as "the use of a printed form or boiler
plate contracts drawn skillfully by the party in the strongest
economic position...in language that is incomprehensible to a
layman or that diverts his attention from the problems raised by
them or the rights given up through them." Supra 706 P.2d 1042.
In totality, these elements precluded a meaningful choice on the
part of Mr. Jennings and his successors in interest to this
contract whose terms are unreasonably favorable to the Defendant.
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This Court should thus hold that the contract is unconscionable
and illusory and find it void.
The Utah Supreme Court in Christopher v. Larson Ford
Sales, 557 P.2d 1009 (1976) examined the question of whether an
implied warranty disclaimer must be conspicuous which presents
identical policy issues to the case at bar.
"[lit is the policy of the law to look with disfavor
upon semi-concealed or obscured self-protective provisions of a contract prepared by one party, which the
other is not likely to notice. We think it is a correct
and salutary rule, that where there are provisions of
this character in a contract, either buried in other
provisions in fine print or are otherwise semi-concealed
or secreted in some manner, such as being found only by
reference to the backside of the document, they should
not be binding on the signer (buyer) unless it is shown
that the provision was actually called to his
attention."
Id. at 1012. See also, Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 400 P.2d 503, 505
(Utah 1965) (holding it was unfair to allow a party to set forth
a clear promise to induce acceptance where another provision
takes away that promise).
Although the words of the term and renewal provisions
may be understood in isolation, when read together they are
deceptive and ambiguous giving a distinct advantage to the
Lessor. As the cases reflect, the policy and letter of the law in
Utah is against the taking of such unfair advantage and requires
a ruling in Plaintiff's favor.
IV. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LEASE HISTORY
SUPPORT A FINDING OF AMBIGUITY AND UNCONSIONIBILTY HEREIN
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The lease contract in question states that it shall be
"bindinq upon the successors and assigns of the parties" thereto.
Judge Uno also specifically found Plaintiff bound by this lease
as a successor in interest. Plaintiff does not dispute that she
understood this language and had notice of this contract at the
time she purchased the property in 1983. Notwithstanding this,
Plaintiff also always had the understanding that the lease could
be terminated after a ten year term. That is, she understood that
she could terminate the contract ten years after it became effective in April, 1977. (Exhibit F, Miller Affidavit; R-85.)
Plaintiff's understanding of the ten year lease term
came directly from her predecessor in interest, Gloria Erickson
who sold the property to her. Mrs. Erickson purchased the property from William Jennings who was the original signer of the
lease contract with the Defendant, Reagan Advertising. Mrs.
Erickson's Affidavit states that when she purchased the property
from Mr. Jennings she first learned of the lease contract at the
time of closing and the lease term was represented to be ten
years.

(Exhibit E, Erickson Affidavit; R-79.) This fact was set

forth in the closing documents which were not disputed by Mr.
Jennings, a copy of which is attached to her Affidavit.

(R-82.)

Plaintiff's Affidavit contains a copy of her title insurance
policy which also confirms that the Reagan Outdoor Advertising
lease term was considered to be a ten year term. (R-88-91.)
Additionally, both of these parties had their respective attor-
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neys review the lease contract at the time of their purchase of
the property and both attorneys confirmed that it was a ten year
lease term which they could terminate at the end of that time.
(Exhibit F, Miller Affidavit, R-85 Exhibit E, Erickson Affidavit,
R-79.)
The Utah Supreme Court case of Hayes v. Gibbs 169 P.2d
781 (Utah 1946) is instructive on whether restrictive covenants
bind successive purchasers beyond the original parties and
applies a five part test. (Case copy, R-92.) Although whether the
contract is binding is not in dispute here, this case states the
importance of reviewing the chain of title and understandings of
prior purchasers as to what restrictions may exist on the property. In it's analysis, the Court refers to the title record as
showing certain restrictions and states that subsequent purchasers are thus chargeable with the knowledge of the purpose for
which those restrictions v/ere made. Supra, 169 P. 2d at 784. In
the present case, all subsequent purchasers from the original
covenantee (William Jennings) and their attorneys understood the
lease term to be ten years.

The chain of title which these

purchasers reviewed as represented by their title companies also
confirmed that the lease was to be ten years.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the title
company acting for Mr. Jennings was his agent when they prepared
the closing documents for his sale of the property to Mrs.
Erickson. That title company documented the Defendant's lease as
one for ten years. (R-82.)
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Without the benefit of Mr. Jennings personal testimony,
the Court must construe the circumstances in this case to find
the most consistent, reasonable interpretation of this lease
term. Plaintiff submits that the provisions of this lease are
more consistent in every way with a ten year term then with an
extended term and many practical elements support this view. For
instance, it is unreasonable to believe a landowner would
knowingly commit to a twenty year term without any formula to
adjust rent, or agree to a lease which gives him no right to terminate before twenty years while giving the tenant essentially a
unilateral right to terminate any time.

These elements favor an

interpretation that a shorter term lease was intended.
It is also possible to construe the Defendant's reading
of the lease and the alleged renewal clause as creating a "perpetual" lease. Courts traditionally disfavor perpetual leases and
they are only upheld if the intent of the parties is clearly
expressed. In the case of Burke v. Permian Ford Lincoln Mercury,
621 P.2d 1119 (New Mexico 1981), the Court states the following:
"[w]ere we to accept the trial court's interpretation of
the lease, Tas allowing successive renewals] the
landlord would be placed in an untenable position
whereby he would have no right to terminate the lease,
no right to negotiate a fair rental price that reflects
the burden of inflation and taxation, and no means of
relieving the property of it's encumbrance. Without a
clear manifestation of the landowner's intent to assume
this position, we cannot allow a trial court to imply
such intent by it's construction of a poorly written
instrument". (Case copy, R-107.)

In the present case, the Court should also consider the practical
-20-

aspects of this case which, if Defendant's arguments were
accepted, would bind the Plaintiff to an unfair and unexpected
result and one which was never understood to be the case by the
Plaintiff or her predecessors.
The issue facing the Court is basically to interpret in
light of the available evidence and by applying rules of
contract construction. The affidavits establish that this
contract has consistently been interpreted as a ten year lease.
None of the successors in interest to Mr. Jennings were informed
or understood that there was a renewal provision or continuation
clause which would make the lease term twenty years as Defendant
argues. Indeed, the word "renew" never appears in the lease,
rather,

misleading language is used referring to "successive

periods". The proven effect of these words was to mislead all of
the successors in interest to Mr. Jennings, that is, Mrs.
Erickson and the Plaintiff; both of their attorneys; and two
title companies, all of whom construed the term to be ten years.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the lease is ambiguous and, as
such, must be construed against the drafter, Defendant Reagan
Outdoor Advertising. Additonally, the lease language is deceptive
and overwhelmingly favorable to the Defendant making it lacking
in mutuality, illusory, unconscionable and therefore void. For
the reasons stated herein, this Court should find the lease term
expired in April, 1987, and is no longer binding on Plaintiff.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of November,

1983.

<7.
SUZANNEi MASELIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the attorney for Defendant/Respondent, Mr.
Douglas T. Hall, 1775 North 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84116, postage prepaid this

/

day of November, 1988.

31200(6)
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LORRAINE MILLER,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v,
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, formerly known as
Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
GLORIA ERICKSON

Civil No. 87-04928
(Judge Raymond Uno)

ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

COMES NOW Gloria Erickson who upon her oath deposes and
says:
1. I am a previous owner of the premises located at 2735
South 20th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, on which Reagan Outdoor
Advertising has a billboard. I purchased this property from
William Jennings in May, 1978, and sold it to Lorraine Miller in
1-9*5. I first learned of the billboard lease to Reagan Outdoor
Advertising about the time of closing on my purchase of the pro-

*mT?

perty from Mr. Jennings in 1978. I learned of the lease from the
title company which told me it was a ten year term lease which
began April 29, 1977. The closing statement from Utah Title
Company at the time of my purchase also reflects this to be the
term of the lease. A copy of that statement is attached to this
Affidavit as Exhibit A.
2. The closing documents were reviewed personally by Mr.
Jennings and myself and he did not dispute the fact that the
Reagan Outdoor Advertising Lease was listed as a ten year term.
3. After I took over the Jennings property I received no
payment under the billboard lease and contacted my attorney, Lee
Pratt, to review the situation and determine my rights. Mr. Pratt
informed me that the lease was proper, that I could not terminate
it, and that I had to wait out the term of the lease which he
stated was ten years from April 29, 1977. A copy of the letter I
received from this Attorney is attached hereto, dated October 13,
1978. Although this letter does not assess the term of the lease
this issue was discussed with Mr. Pratt and his conclusion was
that it was a valid lease for ten years at which time I could
terminate the lease.
4. When I sold the property to Lorraine Miller in 1985,
and I told her that it was a lease for ten years at which time it
could be terminated by her. This was my belief based kon my contact with Mr. Jennings, the closing documents from Utah Title, my
own reading of the lease and the legal reviews I had done of the
lease.

DATED this l«b^—

day of December, 1987.

y<

GLORIA ERICSSON

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
December, 1987.

^^^/^
NOTARY PUBLIC <*-/•/
Residing at: dn uf

My Commission Expires:

24301

/ ^ day of
w\,

/

/
£ g/<r-c

CIAR TITLE CQXPANY
355-7533
629 East 400 South
Salt Loko City. Utah 84102

1—Seller..

Our File No
Listing No.

CLOSING STATEMENT

WILLIAM M. JENNINGS

Address .. .
Phone.

PATSIE A. JENNINGS
2—Buyer

GLORIA. S. ERICKSON

Address
Phone

GLORIA GAY ERICKSON

9.

AssiCNMnn o? CONTRACT FO;; S!:CITIT V vrp?osrs
Assignor:
Assignee:
Arount :
Dated:
Recorded:
Entry No.:
Book/Pace:: '

10.

Amount:
For:

Recorded:
Entry Ko.:
Book/Pare:

12.

13.

WILLIAM K. jrNTTVGr and PATSIK A. JENNIKGS
T'r H-«i*si::r w~<. o r r T OF *n-:r TOINTY OF SALT
1J3T
M y >" 1*77
T -v ??. 1977
W9D/G1F

LIEN
flairwint:

11

T-48276

rKRFCOPvDEri LEASE
Lessor:
Lessee:
Terr::
Dated:
FEDERAL TAX LIEN
Ta^paypr:
Amount:
Dated;
Recorded:
Entry Xe.:

i. \Tijo*: WITPLY? ^

r

DO:-: vrrvpu y

ASSOCIATES,

CU::<I:I:AL CONTRACTS
$4,15';.'JO
Contracted nfehabij.5tation work including
exterior, earnertrr, reoflr.p, plunging,
heating and electrical
April ?0f 197fi
309555f
4658/H13

W!!. II. JLHKITCS dba BILL'S SUPBPEY
PFAC-AJ- CIJTPOC;; A E W . P I I S I : ^ ; ,

i:;c.

10 Year*!
April 2 ° , 1C77
T
V,ITLT,\>' J*V/' rt .--! PA1S ' RE-'
lX56.°"
!;ot Dated
February 26, Is-73
252071^

The terms and conditions of tlr.t cr^rr, Aptcfcr^rt cater* July 17 1
3978, as disclosed bv Vnrrnntv Dt«H ?***< f fa:tiv.it. 25 I°70, recorded
August 26, 1970, as Entry Ko. 23*7451, in Book 2P.91, atppape
6^8 of Official Kccorcls. It: v±U >e n* cersrry to furr.is1: e copy
of said Agreement tc Utab T*t7e n:..: -V street <.o .r"v, Jrfore title
Insurance vill be Iftsued.
* * •u

C»I,YI>I:

£c

ATTORNEYS
3 il • S O U T f - r
SALT

•EL
S~-v £ N

^

LAKE

PUATT
AT L A W

5TflT£;

ST^£Li.T

CITY. UTAH

6<IM

CJEA^Y

£ C .TOE

October 13, 1978

Mr. & Mrs. Frank Erickson
2796 South 20th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Erickson:
I have looked at the Reagan contract. I find in the contract an absolute requirement that the lessee shall pay the
amount of $240.00 annually, payable in quarterly installments.
If in fact he has not paid these quarterly installments and you
have done nothing to indicate a reason why he should not pay or
have in no way extended his time for payment, then he is in
breach of the lease.
If he is in breach of the lease, then you are justified in
refusing to accept his late payment and in telling him that the
lease is terminated. I am sure, however, that in view of the
investment involved he is going to dispute the termination in
any way that he can. Thus, I caution you that in any conversations that you may have with him you should not recognize any
time extension or any reason why he should not have paid, if in
fact there is no such reason.
I understand that you have returned his check which he
brought in to your office yesterday after you had informed him
that the lease was terminated.
I can anticipate, however, that in disputing the termination
he may make some claims that he is losing money by reason of your
wrongful (allegedly) refusal to permit him to go ahead. Thus, I
can anticipate that there will be legal problems and there may be
some claims made against you. Thus in taking this action and
adopting a strong position, you can expect problems.
I will check on the County zoning requirements to see whether

Mr. & Mrs. Frank Erickson
Page 2
October 13, 1978

or not the sign violates those zoning requirements.
I am returning your lease and have made a copy of it for
my file.
Yours truly,

ELP:gbb
Enclosure

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LORRAINE MILLER,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v,

AFFIDAVIT OF
LORRAINE MILLER

)

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, formerly known as
Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 87-04928
(Judge Raymond Uno)

ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

LORRAINE MILLER, Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon
oath, deposes and says that:
1. I am the Plaintiff above-named and am making this
supplemental Affidavit concerning the property that I own at 273
South 20th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, which I purchased in late
1905 from Gloria Erickson. Mrs. Erickson had purchased the property from Mr. William Jennings who is now deceased.
2. I had no personal contact with Mr. Jennings. I first
learned about the billboard lease to Reagan Outdoor Advertising

from Gloria Erickson who sold me the property. At all times she
told me that the lease was for ten years at which time I could
end the lease. She said that an attorney had reviewed it and confirmed this fact. I also had my attorney, Mr. Steven Swindle
review the lease and he told me that it could not be ended by me
until it's full term expired which was ten years from the time it
was signed, April 29f 1977.
3. When I purchased the property from Mrs. Erickson I
also acquired a policy of title insurance which listed all of the
existing liens and interest in that parcel of property. This
title insurance policy listed the unrecorded lease between Mr.
Jennings and Reagan Outdoor Advertising as a ten year lease dated
April 29, 1977. A copy of this title insurance report is attached
to this Affidavit as Exhibit A.
4. At all times during my purchase of this property and
until I attempted to terminate the lease earlier this year, I was
told and believed that the lease could be terminated by me after
ten years.
DATED this n

day of December, 1987.

iWtfML'

w

/I l
J j,J

LORRAINE MILLER
Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
December, 1987.

^<f
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

My Commission Expires:

/hay
24302

f/<?f

/ ^ day of
X2/

x^
J^rA^f

X
"/
^d/^

A L T A - OWNER'S

SAFECO

,

D

N0.180-OP

N?

605525

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE

SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
ISSUED FROM THE OFFICE OF

UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY
629 East 4th South Street
Salt Lake City Utah 84102

SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN
SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF,
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, herein called the Company,
insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the
amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the
Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by
reason of
1

Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein,

2

Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title

3

Lack of a right of access to and from the land or

4

Unmarketability of such title,

and in addition, if a mortgage is referred to in Schedule A as the insured mortgage by reason of
5

The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the
extent that such invalidity or unenforceability or claim thereof arises out of the transaction evidenced by the
insured mortgage and is based upon
a usury, or
b any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law

6

The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage,

7

Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the
insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and
commenced subsequent to Date of Policy not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness
secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to
advance,

8

Any assessments for street improvements under construction or completed at Date of Policy which now have
gained or hereafter may gain priority over the insured mortgage

9

The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment shown in Schedule A of the insured mortgage or the
failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the name insured assignee free and clear of
all hens

In Witness Whereof, SAFECO Title Insurance Company has caused its corporate name and seal
to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A

/

?&£L.ff

Secretary

President

ML A

Art A r*t*,r\rn'rf*si

Cinnoli

SCHEDULE A (Owners - Purchasers - Lessee)
Page 2

OrderNo
Amount of Insurance: $

T-92344
97 000.00

Premium: S
Date of Policy:

423.00
September 3 0 , 1983
at 8:00 A.M.

Name of Insured:
LORRAINE A. MILLER, as her Interest may appear

The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is:
Fee Simple
The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in:
ALYCE BAI, s u b j e c t to the m a r i t a l i n t e r e s t of her husband, i f married

The land referred to in this policy is in the State of Utah, County of
and described as follows:

S a l t Lake

Lot 4, Block A, JOHNSON SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County, Utah.

SCHEDULE B (Standard)

Page
Policy No

3
0p

605525

This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following (all clauses if any which indicate any
preference limitation or discrimination based on race color religion or national origin are omitted from all building and
use restrictions covenants and conditions if any shown herein)
1

Rights or claims of persons in possession or claiming to be in possession easements liens or encumbrances
.ncludmg material or labor hens, which are not shown by the public records reservations in patents or state
grants or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof mineral rights water rights claims or title to minerals or
water

2

Questions of location boundary and areas overlaps and encroachments by improvements belonging to
these or adjoining premises all dependent upon actual survey for determination

3

Assessments whicn are not shown as existing hens by the public records taxes not yet payable pending
proceedings for vacating opening or changing streets or highways preceding entry of the final ordinance or
order therefor

4.

Taxes for the year 1983 are now due and payable, but will not
become delinquent until November 30th.

5.

Said property is included within the boundaries of Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitary District No. 1, and is subject to the charges and
assessments thereof•

6.

COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, RESTRICTIONS and/or EASEMENTS, EXCEPT THOSE
BASED ON RACE, COLOR, CREED OR NATIONAL ORIGIN, CONTAINED IN INSTRUMENT:
Dated:
January 3, 1940
Recorded:
January 3, 1940
Entry No*:
872313
Book/Page:
239/316
A copy of which is attached hereto.

7.

CONTRACT OF SALE AND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN
Seller:
ALYCE BAI aka ALYCE B. ROBERTSON
Purchaser:
WILLIAM M. JENNINGS and PATSIE A. JENNINGS, his
wife, as joint tenants
Dated:
December 1, 1968
Recorded:
October 19, 1977
Entry No.:
3012251
Book/Page:
4566/1173
The interest of WILLIAM M. JENNINGS and PATSIE A. JENNINGS, his
wife was conveyed to GLORIA S. ERICKSON and GLORIA GAYE ERICKSON,
her daughter, as joint tenants by Quit Claim Deed dated May 10,
1978 and recorded May 16, 1978 as Entry No. 3108498, in Book 4673
at page 358 of Official Records.

8.

UNRECORDED LEASE
Lessor:
Lessee:
Term:
Dated:

9.

UNRECORDED UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
Seller:
GLORIA S. ERICKSON and GLORIA GAYE ERICKSON,
her daughter
Purchaser:
LORRAINE A. MILLER
Dated:
September 15, 1983
NOTICE OF CONTRACT
Recorded:
Entry No.:
Book/Page:

jj

WM. M. JENNINGS dba BILL'S SUPPLY
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.
10 years
April 29, 1977

September 16, 1983
3844954
5491/1390

V

Q^

I

Outdoor Advertising^

Inc.
Page 1

This agreement made and entered into by the under* icned lessor, (the **Lessor")
and by Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., (the **Lessee"). Both lessor and lessee
acknowledge the receipt and sufficiency of good and valuable consideration and agree
as follows;
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee arxr its assigns and successor!,
the exclusive right to use the following described property for the purpose of erecting
and maintaining thereon outdoor advertising structures including such necessary device*,
structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may be dfsired by lessee for a

^

term of ten years commencing on or before
at option of lessee, upon the following described land, togethe/ with ingress and^K?>
egress to and upon the same, located in the county of ^.QA-£.fr/lACci.
State of Utah and more

., ^

M

rticu!arK described as follows:

*->!
(Lessst nay plaac oo or
tbc location.)

fttad

^
^

to tliii instromcai, •ubse^jcu: to .caeattion, a xc-ctet v>d bound* dcAtripiioc °f J
A
Vs/s*
V

Lessee shall pax lesser the aroouBt of %.fS\fc£'.<€>C)_
annually, payable
(monthJy.^juarterlyJ semi-annually); however, prior to construction and obtaining
gprmits by lessee the rental shall be FKT Dollars.
Tnis lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive
period; thereafter, this lease shaE continue in full force on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or periods, unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of
termination within ninety days of the end of said term.

^<*
£ £
y
v(^
v

It is further expressly agreed that lessee may terminate this lease by giving written ^ S ^ J ;
notice and paying a penalty of one year's rent at any time within thirty days v*Ty «'
prior to the end of any twelve month period subsequent to the commencement date of ^ ^ \
this lease. Provided further, if the said space becomes obstructed so as to lessen the C^
advertising value of any of lessee's signs erected on said premises, or if traffic is diverted ^ * v j
or reduced, or if the use of any such signs is prevented or restricted by law, or if for *0 f\^
any reason a building permit for erection or modification is refused this lease may, a t ^ ?t> .
the option of lessee, be terminated or the rent reduced to Five Dollars while said ^
^
condition exists and in such event lessor shall refund prorata any prepaid rental S\ %.
for the unexpired term. Lessor agrees that no such obstruction insofar as the szmt is ^
within lessor's control will be permitted or allowed. Lessor authorizes lessee to trim and
cut whatever trees, bushes, brush as it deems necessary for unobstructed view of its ( i 'Yi
advertising display.
fi\^

o

All advertising signs placed upon the described premises are to remain the property v^ T «
of lessee and may be removed by lessee at any time. If lessee is prevented by law, or vL
long
Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the

to sell the property upon which lessee's structure(s) are located and enters into an ^ ^ \
agreement to sell or receives an offer to purchase either which lessor is willing to accept *• &
lessor agrees to first offer the property to lessee on the same terms and conditions and ' ^
lessee shall have thirty days in which to enter into an agreement to purchase with ^ v.^
lessor. It is expressly understood that neither the lessor nor lessee is bound by any >v£\
stipulations, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease.
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shaB be binding upon the he i n ,
personal representatives, successors, and assigns of the parties hereto.
Executed this
LESSEE

day of

JJV.&±L-._

„zZ

UTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.

LESSOR:.4^..^>.<:

EXHIBIT A

Mailing Address

t? fit

£

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORRAINE MILLER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. C-87-4928

vs.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, formerly known as
Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

Summary

Judgment

December 1, 1987.
arguments made.

motions

were

heard

by

this

Court

on

Memoranda were submitted by both parties and

The Court requested any additional information

which would assist the Court in making a ruling on this case.
Supplemental information was provided by both parties.

After

reviewing the file, pleadings, memoranda and arguments, the Court
hereby finds and rules as follows:
The Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. contract is neither a
long nor complicated contract.
of only one page.

As a matter of fact, it consists

The essential terms of the contract provide a

lease to lessee and its assigns and successors for a term of ten
years, commencing on or before the 1st day of May, 1977 at the
option of the lessee of the land at 2735 South 2000 East for
$240.00 annually, payable quarterly.

Further this lease shall

continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive

EXHIBIT B

MILLER V. R.O.A. GENERAL

period.

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Thereafter, this lease shall continue in full force on

the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or
periods, unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination
within ninety days of the end of said term.

(Underlined for

emphasis)
A person who affixes his signature to a contract is presumed
to have read, understood and agreed to the terms of a contract he
signs.

There is no evidence before this Court to show the lessor

was incompetent, under undue influence, or coerced when he signed
the contract, or that he did so involuntarily.

On the contrary,

there is evidence this provision was specifically discussed and
that the lessor knew and understood the lease would continue for
a like successive period or periods.

If he did not agree with

the terms, he could very easily have not signed the lease, had
the provision removed, modified the provision, or had it made
more clear if he did not understand it.

This he failed to do

either because he felt it not necessary, or because he was
satisfied with the contract as written.

As it was pointed out,

two additional provisions were handwritten on the face of the
contract with signatures of the parties affixed to it, further
manifesting

the

intent

of

the

parties,

and

supporting

the

proposition they were satisfied, otherwise, with the contract as
written.

MILLER V. R.O.A. GENERAL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

On its face, the contract is clear who shall be bound by the
terms of the contract.

Specifically, it states "this agreement

shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the
heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the
parties hereto."

(Underlined for emphasis)

It is undisputed

plaintiff is a successor to a successor of the original lessor.
Therefore, she is bound by the terms of the lease.
The terms of the contract are clear and unequivocal.

The

terms cannot be said to be in fine print nor lost in a multipaged document.

The print is clear and of the same size for the

entirety of the contract.

It follows sequentially with the

original lease term and there is no attempt to conceal or mislead
the lessor.

It is designated in a separate paragraph in plain

and understandable language.
only one page.

Finally, the contract consists of

It may be read, very slowly, in five minutes.

There is no question the lease is a ten year lease.

More

importantly, however, upon carefully reading the lease anyone,
including a lay person, will understand there is an option to
continue the lease for a "like successive period" to be exercised
by the lessee.
term

of

the

understanding.

Obviously, there was some attention paid to this
lease

because

the

affidavits

so

state "their"

If there clearly was any question, a legal

opinion should have been requested at the time the issue arose
specifically asking what "continue for a like successive period"

MILLER V. R.O.A. GENERAL

meant.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

There is nothing in evidence to demonstrate this simple

procedure was undertaken.
Parties are entitled to the benefit of the bargain they
enter into.

Since the original lessor is now deceased, the

presumption is he received the benefit of his bargain at the time
the lease was entered into.
received a bad bargain.

We cannot, from hindsight, say he

If he had continued to live and held

this property, he may still be satisfied with the lease.

Because

his successor is unhappy, should not be any reason to deny an
innocent lessee from the benefit of his side of the bargain.
Unconscionability

must

be

determined

based

on

the

circumstances of the case at the time the lease was entered into.
There is no evidence to show the lessor did not benefit from the
lease, or that the terms of the lease were unconscionable to the
lessor at the date, time, place and his circumstances.

At this

time, this Court cannot find the contract was unconscionable at
the time the lease was signed.
A contract may become unconscionable because of subsequent
events.

Again, the affidavits submitted by plaintiff do not

support any grounds to show unconscionableness.
they

knew, or should

contract.

As successors,

have known, the express terms of the

If they had any questions or were unhappy with being

successors to a contract they disliked, they had the option of
negotiating then or not purchasing the property.

This they

MILLER V. R.O.A. GENERAL

failed to do.
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Pleading ignorance or lack of understanding to a

contract after affixing ones signature to it is, generally, as a
matter of law, insufficient to set aside a contract.
It is the general rule that where the provision of renewal
or continuance of a lease is stated in general terms, the lease
will

be

construed

as providing

for

only

one

renewal.

50

Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, Section 1171 (1970) as cited in
Burke v. Permian Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 671 P.2d 1119 (1981).

The

Court, however, does not find any ambiguity in the phrase for a
"like successive period.11

If, perchance, there is any ambiguity,

the lessee would still be entitled to one

ten year renewal

period under this lease agreement.
Based on the foregoing findings, the Court now makes and
enters its Order hereby denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment,

and

hereby

grants

is

prepare

defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.
Defendant

to

proper

Findings

pursuant to this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

4th

day of January, 1988.

RAYMOND S. UNO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

and

Judgment
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
*Cp

Decision,

postage

day of January, 1988:

Suzanne Marelius
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Douglas T, Hall
Attorney for Defendant
1775 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

I2L

prepaid,

to

the
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORRAINE MILLER,
1

Plaintiff,
vs.

1
)

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC,. A Utah
Corporation, Formerly Known as
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. C87-4928
(Judge Uno)

Defendant,

The Parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment
were heard by the court on December 1, 1987.
appeared through counsel, Suzanne Marelius.

The Plaintiff
The Defendant

appeared through its counsel, Douglas T. Hall.

The Court heard

the argument of counsel and thereafter requested that additional
information be submitted by counsel to assist the court in making
a ruling on the case.

Subsequently, additional information was

provided by both parties.

After reviewing the file, the pleadings

therein, the memorandum and arguments of parties' counsel and the
objections to the Courts original Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law amendments thereto have been made and the court does now
hereby make the following amended
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

That the Reagan Outdoor Advertising Contract, which

is the subject matter of this lawsuit, is neither a long nor
complicated contracted and, as a matter of fact, consists of only
one page.
2.

The essential terms of the contract provide a lease

to lessee and its assigns and successors for a term of ten (10)
years, commencing on or before the first day of may, 1977, at the
option of the lessee, of the land at 2735 South, 2000 East, for
$240.00 Annually, payable quarterly,
3.

The lease further provides for its continuance on

the same terms and conditions for a like successive period.
4.

Furthermore, the lease provides that it shall

thereafter continue in full force on the same terms and conditions
for a like successive period or periods, unless lessor delivers to
lessee notice of termination within ninety (90) days at the end of
said term.
5.

There is no evidence before the court to show that

the original lessor, William M. Jennings, was incompetent, under
undue influence, or coerced when he signed the contract, or that
he did so involuntarily.
6.

That the provisions providing for the term of the

lease were specifically discussed and that the original lessor
knew and understood the lease would continue for a "like
successive period or periods".
7.

That the original lessor did not require the

provisions regarding the "like successive period or periods" of
the lease term to be removed or modified either because he felt it

was not necessary, or because he was satisfied with the contract
as written,
8.

Additional provisions were handwritten on the face

of the contract with the signatures of the parties affixed to it,
further manifesting the intent of the parties' and supporting the
proposition that they were satisfied, otherwise, with the contract
as written.
9.

The lease agreement further states that "this

agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon
the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the
parties hereto."
10.

The plaintiff is a successor to or a successor of

the original lessor.
11.

The print on the lease agreement is clear and of

the same size for the entirety of the contract. There is no
attempt to conceal or mislead the lessor.
12.

The provisions of the contract with regard to the

original lease term and its subsequent terms is designated in a
separate paragraph in plain and understandable language.
13.

The lease contract as a whole can be read, very

slowly, in five minutes.
14.

There is no evidence that a legal opinion was

requested at the time the issue arose with regard to the "like
successive period" provision of the lease agreement.
15.

The original lessor is now deceased.

16.

There is no evidence to show the original lessor

did not benefit from the lease or that the terms of the lease were

unconscionable to the lessor at that date, time, place and under
the circumstances attending the original lessor at that time*
17.

Successor lessors failed to obtain a legal opinion

specifically asking what "continue for a like successive period"
meant.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the court
makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The terms of the lease agreement are clear and

unequivocal.
2.

The terms cannot be said to be in find print nor

lost in a multi-page document.
3.

The plaintiff is^bound by the terms of the lease

agreement as written.
4.

The courts presumption is that the original lessor

received the benefit of his bargain at the time the lease was
entered into.
5.

Because the successor lessor is unhappy is no

reason to deny an innocent lessee from the benefit of his side
of the bargain.
6.

The court cannot say that the original lessor

received a bad bargain.
7.

The court cannot find that the contract was

unconscionable at the time the lease was signed.

The affidavits

submitted by the plaintiff did not support any grounds to support
unconscionableness.

8.

Plaintiff's pleading in this case regarding

ignorance or lack of understanding is insufficient to sent aside
this lease agreement.
9.

The court finds no ambiguity in the phrase for a

"like successive period".
10.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should

be denied and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should
~

be granted.
DATED this

A

T- " day 0 fttoRRsii,1988.
BY THE COURT:

V^ycrz^-*J*C^

A-tt-o

Raymond S. Uno,
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^c<C ^ c ^
Suzanne Marelius,
Attorney for Plaintiff

^s,
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V
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Salt Lake County Utah
DOUGLAS T. HALL #1305
Attorney for Defendant
1775 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801)521-1775
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORRAINE MILLER,
ORDER ON PARTIES MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-87-4928
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., A Utah
Corporation, Formerly Known as
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

(Judge Uno)

Defendant.

The Parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment
were heard by the court on December 1, 1987.
appeared through counsel, Suzanne Marelius.

The Plaintiff
The Defendant

appeared through its counsel, Douglas T. Hall.

The Court heard

the argument of counsel and thereafter requested that additional
information be submitted by counsel to assist the Court in making
a ruling on the case.

Subsequently, additional information was

provided by both parties.

After reviewing the file, the pleadings

therein, the memorandum and arguments of parties' counsel and
having previously made and entered it Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and being duly apprised in the premises, it is
hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is

2*

The Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is

3,

Said outdoor advertising lease contract is not

denied.

granted.

unconscionable and shall not be set aside,
4.

That the outdoor advertising lease agreement which

is the subject matter of this action is a ten (10) year lease
which is not ambiguous in providing for an additional ten (10)
year term for a "like successive period".
DATED this ^<^^

day of Feta3*a-ry, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

^^^Aij^y^
Raymond S. Uno,
District Judge_
^
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Sirzanne Marelius,
Attorney for Plaintiff

r ^ H- D;;<f\ ^

^ ^ v x t /
£<<£/< / ^ ^
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Salt Lake Cour.jy Utah
DOUGLAS T. HALL 11305
Attorney for Defendant
1775 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone (801)521-1775
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORRAINE MILLER,
Plaintiff,

I

vs.

)

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC,. A Utah
Corporation, Formerly Known as
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. C87-4928

]
(Judge Uno)

Defendant.

The Parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment
were heard by the court on December 1, 1987.
appeared through counsel, Suzanne Marelius.

The Plaintiff
The Defendant

appeared through its counsel, Douglas T. Hall.

The Court heard

the argument of counsel and thereafter requested that additional
information be submitted by counsel to assist the court in making
a ruling on the case.

Subsequently, additional information was

provided by both parties.

After reviewing the file, the pleadings

therein, the memorandum and arguments of parties' counsel and the
objections to the Courts original Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law amendments thereto have been made and the court does now
hereby make the following amended
FINDINGS OF FACT

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LORRAINE MILLER,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
v.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., A Utah
Corporation, formerly known as
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., A Utah Corporation,
Civil No. C87-4928
(Judge Uno)

Defendant.
ooOoo

Lorraine Miller, Plaintiff herein, gives notice of her
appeal to the Supreme Court, State of Utah, from the decision on
Summary Judgment rendered by the Honorable Raymond Uno, Judge
presiding, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. Plaintiff appeals the following Judgment:
1. Amended Order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on Motions for Summary Judgment entered April 4, 1988.
DATED this

ty

day of May, 1988.

"3^.
' c t t *-£

c ->

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff

-1-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Attorney for the Defendant, Mr. Douglas T.
Hall, 1775 North 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116, postage
prepaid this J^fday of May, 1988.
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SUZANNE MARPLJ US - ;08]
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Ut a
°4]02
;r
Telephone:
f 80 1 i
I
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STATI" OF UTAH

I

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
LORRAINE MTT.r.ER,
I1

| 11

! 11111 I \'

,k

|

1 Ifjp11 s e s a 11 *.I iJay 1 3 i 1' 1 a l. ;
1

('actus

-iinl

-'III In Kii.sl,

' .in 'he Plaintiff above named and am the owner nf
T i f' 111 i 1 v t 1 '! 11I III II1 1I1

N.i 1 t

the adjacent

Lake C i t y ,

property

1 i t. |, , 1)1* a I ni II'II II'I
operate

I

a business
2

I'.dsl

f' 1 a i n t i f 1 , I

W'bpt]

Il w a s t o l d

Utah

located
Ii I I>H

called

1 I 111 m«i 1 in

at

84109

71 iS S o u t h

1 1 1 «""l

by t h e s e l l e i

1 In

1

">0rh Enrit,,

|

nan

1111 ill In

nj
hake

I1" I Hi" 1 aii J ui'i w h i c h

Idle
SI1 »| .

piopcr 1 1

thai

' 1

I am . a l s o t h e own*-r

the Southwest

1 purchased

I 1 M . n'l'i 1) . i l l

11 " / I'I " M

"1 wou.ld h e t h e s u c c e s s o r

'1

1 now

interest to a lease executed between William Jennings and Reagan
Outdoor Advertising/ Inc., dated April 29, 1977.

That Lease pro-

vided for the rental of a billboard on those premises and I was
told that it was a ten year Lease which would terminate in May
1987.
3.

Throughout my ownership of the property at 2735

South 20th East the Defendant Reagan Advertising, Inc., as
lessee, has maintained an advertising billboard at that location
and has received advertising revenue from that
billboard and paid me rental pursuant to the Lease.
4.

I notified Reagan by letter dated January 26, 1987,

that I desired to terminate the Lease as of May 1, 1987.

I also

had my attorney send a certified letter dated April 29, 1987, to
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. informing them that I desired to
terminate the lease and requesting that they remove the billboard
and restore the condition of the ground to its original form.
5.

Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., has refused to

terminate the Lease and has informed me that they interpret it as
a twenty year Lease.
6.

The presence of the billboard on my property is

damaging my business by preventing me from effectively advertising; by limiting my access to my business and by preventing me
from enlarging my driveway to expand my business operations.
7. I believed, and was told by the prior owners of
the premises, that the lease was for a term of ten (10) years and

expired on May

I

r s.pa Si". I fh|

on my property,
nn
DATED this £?

day of Ju?y, - o ^ .

/ > 'U
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LORRAINE MILLER
Plaintiff

J u ] y, 1987.
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